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criminal suspects. 70 YALE L.J. 694, 724 (1961). Lie detectors have
been valuable in determining the validity of paternity claims. 4
DE PAUL L. REV. 31 (1954). It is well settled that confessions
obtained by the use of lie detectors are admissible if otherwise
properly obtained. Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 1310 (1952).
In preliminary investigations as distinguished from judicial
litigation, the use of lie detectors seems to have passed beyond the experimental stage. Several states allow lie detector evidence upon stipulation, and upon the theory that absolute infallibility is not the
standard for admissibility of scientific evidence. The status of lie
detector evidence in West Virginia seems an open question although
the use of polygraph evidence has been advocated in 48 W.VA. L.Q.
37 (1941-2). The eventual admission of lie detector evidence does
appear feasible, with further investigation and research into interrogation techniques, the formulation of standards for polygraph examinations, and the use of multiple scientific techniques to record the reactions of those being examined.
John Everett Busch
Federal Courts-Personal Jurisdiction Not Required in

Transfer to Cure Venue Defect
Anti-trust action was transferred from the district court in state
A to the district court in state B because of improper venue. Court
B dismissed the action on the grounds that court A lacked authority
to transfer the action since it did not have personal jurisdiction over
the Ds. Held, reversed. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1958), permits the
court in the district in which the action is filed to transfer it to
another district, when venue is laid in the wrong district, if it be in the
interest of justice, whether the court in which the action was originally
filed had personal jurisdiction or not. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369
U.S. 463 (1962).
Prior to 1948 if the defendant's objection to improper venue
was sustained the action had to be dismissed, because there was no
machinery to transfer the case. To avoid this harsh rule, in 1948,
Congress enacted a provision which provided for a transfer to a court
in which venue was proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1948). In 1949,
this provision was amended to provide for a dismissal or "if it be in
the interest of justice" to transfer to a district in which it could have
been brought. 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a) (1958). This amendment was
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enacted to prevent a plaintiff from deliberately bringing an action in
the wrong district to effect service of process on the defendant and
after perfection of such process, obtaining a transfer of the case
to the proper district. If such abuse is found in a particular case,
the court has the power of dismissal. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.146(3), 0.146(4) (2d ed. 1961).
Transfers under this section would only arise when there is a
defect in venue, and a majority of cases concede that transfer is
authorized under the section where the transferor-court has personal
jurisdiction. Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527 (3d
Cir. 1961); Orion Shipping and Trading Co. v. U.S., 247 F.2d 755
(9th Cir. 1957). The principal case has broadened the apparent scope
of this section by permitting transfer where the court lacks personal
jurisdiction if it be in the interest of justice, thus ending the conflict
between the Circuit Courts of Appeal over this subject. Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961); Hohensee v. News
Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1961); Orion Shipping and
TradingCo. v. U.S., 247 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1957); Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1954).
By this holding, plaintiffs who have begun an action can transfer
the action rather than having it dismissed and then going through the
formality of re-filing the case. Thus the policy of the federal courts
to orderly and expeditiously adjudicate cases would be furthered.
Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1954).
Another effect of this decision would be that a plaintiff who acts
in good faith will not be required to begin his action again because of a
mere technicality. Dismissal for improper venue would be a severe
penalty and should be reserved for cases where the institution in an
improper venue evidences an element of bad faith on behalf of the
plaintiff. Courts should strive to decide and dispose of cases rather
than dismiss litigants on pleas in abatement. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 'f 0.146(5) (2d ed. 1961).
Arguments in support of the principal case are based on the
fact that Congress intended to extend this section to situations where
transfer can be made without personal jurisdiction. It is also contended that decisions denying power to transfer where the court
lacks personal jurisdiction seem to read into the provision a restriction
which its language does not contain and which defeats its purpose.
BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 88 (Supp.
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1961). This argument further asserts that Congress negatived any
abuse of this section by leaving with the court the power of discretion
to choose between dismissal and transfer. The standard to determine
if an action should be transfered is controlled by the flexible legal
cliche "if it be in the interest of justice". 1 MooRE, FEDERAL
0.146(5) (2d ed. 1961). In Internatio-Rotterdam,Inc.
PRACTICE
v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1954) and Skilling v. Funk,
173 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mo. 1959), the courts held that transfer was
in the interest of justice if the plaintiff acts in good faith and such
transfer will expedite the adjudication of the case. On the other hand,
transfer should not be ordered if inequitable or vexatious. Petroleum
Finance Corp. v. Stone, 116 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
To the opposite extreme, other authorities argue that the section
should be strictly construed and that any extention of the provision
by courts enter the realm of judicial legislation. The refusal to
transfer has generally been based on the proposition that until service
of process is perfected, and personal jurisdiction obtained, no action
is brought and the court may not issue any decree affecting an adverse
party. It is also contended that since the section was enacted to cure
venue defects and also contains a section providing for waiver of
venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (b) (1958), that it is presupposed that
the defendant has been served and has the opportunity to object.
Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1961);
Comment, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 902 (1961).

It should also be noted that before a transfer will be allowed, the
transferor-court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
case. FirstNat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493
(7th Cir. 1951). This contention was also upheld before the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1958), in U.S. v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435
(1936), in which the court held that a court without subject-matter
jurisdiction is powerless to affect the proceedings in any way. Further
confirmation of this point is found in Internatio-Rotterdam,Inc. v.
Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1954), where it was held that
if the transferor-court has subject-matter jurisdiction, failure of the
plaintiff to effect service in the transferor-district should not act as a
rigid bar to a transfer to a district where venue would be proper and
service could be made on the defendant.
It also seems that the section would be inoperative if personal
service of process cannot be obtained in either the transferor or transferee district. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954) held
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that if the transferor-court does not have service of process over
the defendant and the defendant is not amenable to service of process
in the transferee-district, even though venue is proper in both districts,
the transferor-court could not transfer the action because both courts
lack personal jurisdiction over the defendant, unless he submits
thereto. Certainly if the transferor-court does not have jurisdiction
over the defendant's person, the transferee-court could not obtain
jurisdiction by the act of transfer alone. Wilson v. Kansas City So.
Ry., 101 F. Supp, 56 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Scarmardo v. Mooring, 89
F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1950)
The decision in the principal case has clarified the interpretation
of the statute and has set out a rule to be followed in the future.
Since personal jurisdiction is not prerequisite to transfer, the use of the
section will be expanded to situations where the plaintiff, acting in
good faith, mistakenly believes the defendant to be a resident of the
transferor-district. This will enable the federal courts to more swiftly
and easily adjudicate cases to the best interests of the parties concerned.
Frank Thomas Graff, Jr.
Labor Law-Norris-LaGuardia Act-Power of Federal Court
to Enjoin Breach of No Strike Clause
An employer and union agreed to arbitrate all grievances concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The union
also promised to engage in no strikes or work stoppages. However, on
nine different occasions during a period of nineteen months, production was in fact interrupted by labor strife. The employer sought
injunctive relief, but both the district and circuit court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court in a five to
three decision, held, affirmed. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1958) proscribes injunctive relief against concerted activities
arising out of labor disputes. SinclairRef. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S.
238 (1962).
In construing § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958), the United States Supreme Court decided
that Congress intended federal substantive law fashioned from national labor policy to apply in labor disputes. Textile Workers of
America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Supreme Court
held in that case that a federal district court could grant specific per-
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